European Space
Conference: Opening speech by High
Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell
Ladies and gentlemen,
Representatives of the German
and Swedish government, of the European Space Agency
(ESA),
I am really happy to be here
with you today. This is for me one of the most
pleasant moments of my work in Brussels. I know how
important is space and how important is the work you
are doing.
This is a high-level event that
gathers stakeholders in the European space sector.
It has become one of the main events on space in the
European community.
I have to thank the organiser,
Joëlle [Vanderauwera, Co-Founder of Business
Bridge], who has been, for 15 years, pushing for
this event to take place, organising it, [and]
gathering all of us here together.
Here, there are the
decision-makers, emerging leaders from the European
policy-making, industry, European institutions – I
represent them –, Ministers responsible for space,
heads of space agencies, and chiefs of industry.
The subject you have chosen for
this year’s Conference is very appropriate:
security.
One year ago, we were just on
the eve of war. We did not know – well, we were more
or less sure that this was going to happen – but now
we are in the middle of a war. So, security [and
the] security of Europe in the space [domain] is a
very timely subject.
I already had the pleasure to
take part in this Conference in person in 2020 and
2022, and – thanks to COVID-19 – by video message in
2021.
The purpose of my intervention
is to highlight the current geopolitical context of
space, its relevance for the security and defence
perspective. Remember that I am in charge of
building the European defence capabilities. And
explain the efforts that we have been doing at the
European Union in this domain – the domain of space,
naturally, in the context of the Russian aggression
against Ukraine. The most important deliverable
which is the Space Strategy for Security and Defence
which we, at the [European] External Action Service
(EEAS) and the European Commission, together with my
friend and colleague [Commissioner for Internal
Market, Thierry] Breton have been working in the
past few months.
This Strategy was called by the
Strategic Compass, has been consulted with Member
States and its adoption as a Joint Communication
will be taking place in March.
This is the résumé or the
guidelines for my speech. Once again, [I am] very
happy to be here. Since I started my mandate as High
Representative, I have always been here because I am
convinced of the strategic importance of space. Last
year, I stressed the increased levels of threats in
the space domain and the need [for] a change of
paradigm when it comes to space, security and
defence.
So, you heard me say already
say what I am going to say. That space has become a
key strategic domain. It is affecting not only all
aspects of our life, but it is a key resource or a
key battlefield for security and defence. That the
geopolitical competition in which are, which we see
on Earth is now increasingly projected up in space,
and that we need to prepare for an increasingly –
still more - competitive and contested space
environment.
I do not want to use the word
“battlefield” but, yes, space will become a kind of
battlefield: at least, a place where competition and
confrontation will take place.
There are many figures that
show the growing importance of the space sector.
Last year, governments around
the world allocated around $100 billion to space.
Well, we can compare that to the support that we
have been providing to Ukraine during the war.
The European Union has provided
€50 billion on support to Ukraine. So, the
investment, the governmental expenditure is $100
billion – twice our support to Ukraine during a
one-year war.
This is a 9% increase [in
investment in space] compared to the previous year.
What is particularly relevant
is that the increase of the expenditure in the
defence area is much bigger.
Specifically in the defence area, it is 16% [in
2022] - almost [doubling], with a new record of
almost $50 billion of investment.
Obviously, this strategic
dimension of space has become much more evident
after 24 February [2022]. We are more or less one
month from the [anniversary of the] starting of the
war.
This war was a wake-up call. It
was a wake-up call for all of us: not just for
Ukraine, not just for the Europeans, [but also] for
the international community and international
security - and specifically in terms of space.
So, when it comes to the
threats that we face and the urgency of a common
European action, we have to look at concretely how
space assets and services are crucial for policy
makers, as well as military actors.
[Did] you know that there are
about 5,500 satellites in orbit today? 10% of them -
a little bit less than 10% - 500 [450] are owned and
[or] operated by the world’s military. 10%, or
almost, of all the satellites belong to the
military.
But many others are dual-use:
they are being used both by civilian and military
users, and they provide critical information to
support our security and defence.
We have seen – I have seen –
how these space services are essential for
understanding these fast-changing crises and how the
conflict on the ground develops.
For instance, satellite imagery
and communications have proved to be game changers
for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and for the entire
population.
They have been providing
critical information and situational awareness to
help resist the attack.
They have kept Ukrainians
connected to their country and the outside world.
We have seen how the ability to
deny the use of space to the adversary is part of
warfare.
Remember that the night before
the invasion – the [night of] 23 [to] 24 February,
just 24 hours before the invasion started - the
telecommunication network VIASAT was targeted by a
cyber-attack. A simple, unsophisticated malicious
code – not hundreds of guns, just a code – managed
to bring down entire parts of a big space
communications network used by the Ukrainian
military. This was the first signal that the war was
going to start.
The war has also revealed our
own vulnerabilities linked to space and to the use
of space.
The same cyber-attack against
VIASAT on the eve of the war had spillover effects
also in Europe: wind turbines in one of our Member
States went down [at] the same moment. And it took
time to understand the link between the energy
infrastructure and the satellite network which is
commanding it.
This raises a certain number of
critical questions, of strategic questions.
How many of our critical
infrastructures in the European Union depend on
space services? Yes, we know that our phones depend
on the space services, but how many of our critical
infrastructures? Things that we need and if they
fail, our entire life, the entire system of our
economies and societies will be affected.
And how [are] these services
being protected? The other day, the European
Commission and NATO were together in order to try to
protect our critical infrastructures. How many of
these critical infrastructures are in space? Well,
this is something that we still do not know exactly.
Like in other sectors, we are becoming much more
aware of the dependencies, for example, on foreign
suppliers.
For example, when the Russian
Soyuz teams suddenly left the space port of Kourou,
they put in danger our launch capabilities. I am
sure Commissioner [for Internal Market, Thierry]
Breton will say more about it.
Before the invasion, in
November 2021, Russia tested a kinetic
anti-satellite weapon. This was an irresponsible act
that not only generated dangerous debris in the
space, it [also] signaled to everyone that Russia is
prepared to put everyone’s satellites at risk. If
they could do that with one satellite, they could do
it with our satellites.
All these events highlighted
the range of counter-space capabilities that our
competitors are developing, and they are
increasingly testing to deploy: from anti-satellite
weapons to spoofing and jamming satellite signals or
cyber-attacks.
So, I ask you: what if the next
hostile act in space targets a European Union
satellite? This may happen. The possibility exists.
Will we wait to be surprised? Or should we be
preparing to protect our infrastructures?
These are the questions that we
[ask] ourselves at the European Commission and at
the [European] External Action Service (EEAS). The
answer is that we have to do it at the European
Union level. It is the typical policy that has no
borders. So, it is useless to try to do that at the
level of each and [every] one of our Member States.
The best thing to do is to do it at the European
Union level.
Which are the implications,
then, for our European Union policy response?
Yes, the Russian invasion [of
Ukraine] has compounded the threats that we see in
space. And yes, it exposed the vulnerability our
[space] systems [to] disruption.
But it also boosted our resolve
to address security and defence more urgently and
jointly in the European Union, including in space.
When we approved the Strategic
Compass, when the Member States approved it in March
last year, just after [the start of] the war, it
sent a clear message, a clear sense of direction. It
recognises space as a strategic domain and calls for
a dedicated [Space] Strategy [for] Security and
Defence.
We have been working during the
last 10 months very closely with Commissioner [for
Internal Market, Thierry] Breton and with Member
States on the preparation of this strategy that will
be presented in March. Sorry, I cannot present it
today, but it will be another occasion for a big
event for the satellite family.
This Strategy is expected to
address many of the questions I put on the table
today. Which are these questions?
First, how to improve our
common understanding of the space threats?
We need to reinforce our capacity to analyse
space-based risks, threats and vulnerabilities, and
get a better insight on counter-space capabilities
and intentions of our competitors.
Second, how to better protect
our space infrastructure and make it more resilient?
Yes, we have to strengthen our infrastructure by
reducing strategic dependencies, protecting supply
chains and developing critical space technologies.
Third, how to respond to
threats in the space domain? We have to start doing
regular exercises and explore options for solidarity
and mutual assistance among us.
Fourth, how to strengthen our
space capabilities in support of our security and
defence? We have to make better use of the benefits
of space-based assets for security and defence, to
strengthen dual-use innovation and invest more in
capability development.
Allow me to put the example of
the European Union Satellite Centre in Torrejón
(Spain), an example of a critical European
capability.
This Centre, years after its
creation, it remains a key geospatial intelligence
provider. And I can tell you, during this war we
benefited a lot from the information provided by
this Satellite Centre. It has been our common eyes
from the space to see what is happening on the
ground.
The demand for the Satellite
Centre of Torrejón has been growing.
Last year, it provided us with
over 4,500 geospatial intelligence products, which
means 10 times more compared to 12 years ago. To
increase the output by 10 [times] is quite a
success. Well, we would be very happy if we would
have not needed it. It would be much better not to
have a war, but having a war, the Centre has been
able to increase [by] 10 times its output in order
to provide more information.
This success has to be
capitalised [on]. And we have to see how to use this
to better support our decision-making in the area of
security.
And finally, another important
question is how do we cooperate better with our
partners?
We must continue promoting
reliable behaviour, responsible behaviour in space,
and we have to look for a growing community of
like-minded allies and partners that we need to work
more closely with.
The first example is NATO. In
the Joint Declaration between the European Union and
NATO, which was signed earlier this month, we
identified space as one of the new areas of
cooperation.
Let’s build [on that] in
concrete terms. Let's go from the general statements
of goodwill and wishes to concrete deliverables.
Dear colleagues and friends,
To answer all these questions
and to translate them into policy choices and
concrete actions, we will have to work – all of us –
together.
This means that everyone being
represented here – Member States, the [European]
Commission and key stakeholders of the space sector
– a lot will depend on us, a lot will depend on you
in order to become more security aware, more active
in information sharing and more collaborative.
We have a certain tendency of
working in silos, everyone in their corner. This is
no longer affordable.
We need the community of people
working on space issues and facing space threats to
be more cooperative, to work better together in
order to face the threats and ensure security both
in space and from space.
That is why the theme of this
year’s Conference - “Security of the future in
Europe in Space” - is a common objective because it
will not be security if we cannot control what is
happening in Space.
And without security in space,
there will not be security on Earth. We will not be
secure if we do not control what is happening in
outer space.
So, I am very happy to
encourage you to go in this direction. I hope you
will have good discussions over the next two days.
We will benefit a lot from it.
And I invite you, Joëlle
[Vanderauwera], when this Space Strategy for
Security and Defence will be approved in a couple of
months, maybe it will be another occasion to
organise a specific encounter, a specific meeting
for everybody to be aware of what we propose –
because one thing is to propose, and another thing
is to implement. And, certainly, without you, this
Strategy will become another paper to keep carefully
on a shelf – I hope not.
Thank you very much for the floor
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